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Abstract
To allow society to treat unequal alternatives distinctly we propose a natural exten-
sion of Approval Voting [7] by relaxing the assumption of neutrality. According to
this extension, every alternative receives ex-ante a non-negative and finite weight.
These weights may differ across alternatives. Given the voting decisions of every
individual (individuals are allowed to vote for, or approve of, as many alternatives
as they wish to), society elects all alternatives for which the product of total num-
ber of votes times exogenous weight is maximal. Our main result is an axiomatic
characterization of this voting procedure.
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1 Introduction
Approval Voting [7] is perhaps the most well known voting procedure that has been pro-
posed as an alternative to the Plurality Rule. For example, in a recent survey Brams and
Fishburn [8] lay out that the United Nations General Assembly, several scientific institu-
tions (among others the Mathematical Association of America, the American Mathematical
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Society, the American Statistical Association), and some political parties (i.e., in Penn-
sylvania) adopted Approval Voting or had at least some experience with it. According to
this rule, every voter can vote for, or approve of, as many alternatives as s/he wishes to
and given the response profile of individual approvals, society elects the set of alternatives
with the highest amount of total votes.
Very recently, it has been looked at Approval Voting from different points of view.
First, several case studies have been carried out. For instance, Laslier [16] studies the 1999
elections of the President and the Council of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare,
where Approval Voting was the method being used but voters were also asked to submit
their rankings under the Borda count. Laslier [17] analyzes Approval Voting by means of
an experiment carried out in six places in France during the first round of the presidential
election of 2002, in which Jean-Marie Le Pen came in second, defeating the socialist can-
didate Lionel Jospin, and thus, obtained the right to compete in the second round against
Jacques Chirac. Second, wide theoretical research has also been under way. Regenwetter
and Tsetlin [19] compare Approval Voting with positional voting methods and identify
conditions under which they tend to agree. Vorsatz [23] shows that, on the domain of
dichotomous preferences, Approval Voting coincides with the Borda count. De Sinopoli
et al. [10] analyze strategic behavior in Approval Voting games. Brams and Sanver [9]
study Approval Voting under the assumption that voters do not only have preferences on
the set of alternatives but also judgements about their acceptability. Nitzan and Baharad
[18] study the consequence of modifying Approval Voting by restricting the minimal and
maximal number of alternatives that can be voted for, and, finally, Dellis and Oak [11]
compare Approval Voting with the Plurality Rule in a political competition model with
endogenous candidacy entry.
It is inherent in the definition of Approval Voting that every vote counts the same,
independently which alternative receives it. We believe that this neutrality assumption
is relevant in democratic processes where all alternatives should be treated equally (i.e.,
presidential elections), but may not be as natural for group decision making problems in
which the characteristics of the alternatives are objectively different and society agrees on
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the desirability to treat unequal alternatives distinctly (i.e., in the case when alternatives
are candidates seniority, age, education, race, gender, and others may matter). Hence, it is
our objective to propose a natural extension of Approval Voting and present an axiomatic
characterization of this new voting procedure.
The generalization we consider,Weighted Approval Voting, is simple and intuitive at the
same time: Assign ex-ante to every alternative a non-negative and finite weight. Observe
that the weights are potentially different for distinct alternatives. Given the approvals
of every voter (again voters can vote for as many alternatives as they wish to), society
elects the set of alternatives for which the product of total number of votes times weight is
maximal. This voting rule reduces to Approval Voting when the weights are identical and
strictly positive for all alternatives.
We are interested in general voting procedures that could operate in different voting
situations in which the set of voters as well as the set of alternatives might vary (for
instance, different choices have to be made over time). In particular, and given a universal
set of potential voters and a set of conceivable alternatives, a voting procedure (a family
of voting rules) should specify an outcome for every electorate (the subset of voters that
indeed vote) and every set of feasible alternatives (the subset of alternatives that are
indeed at stake). Thus, our axiomatic analysis of Weighted Approval Voting allows for
a variable electorate and a variable set of feasible alternatives. Consequently, we require
the satisfaction of two consistency conditions that link the elected outcome made by the
voting procedure at different situations; namely, they keep track on how the set of elected
alternatives changes as the electorate or the set of feasible alternatives varies. Consistency
in alternatives requires that if the set of feasible alternatives is reduced, then the set of
elected alternatives in the new situation coincides with the set of elected alternatives in the
original situation restricted to the new set of feasible alternatives (provided that this set is
not empty). This is an Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives like condition that conveys
a separability feature to the voting procedure: a general election from a set of feasible
alternatives can be reduced to choices among pairs of alternatives only. Consistency in
alternatives insures then that collecting the choices made at each of the pairs coincides with
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the general election. In our case, consistency of alternatives will guarantee additionally the
transitivity of the weights and hence, it will be possible to focus mainly on elections from
sets with only two alternatives. These are the reasons why we can define the other four
properties only with respect to two alternatives, say x and y. Consistency in voters asks
that if two disjoint electorates elect from the set {x, y} a common set of alternatives, then
exactly this set has to be elected whenever all voters within the two electorates and no voter
outside the two electorates participates in the election. According to the third property,
anonymity, the only information taken into account is how many votes x and y receive
(and not from whom the votes come). The no-support condition states that whenever x
does not receive any vote, then y has to be elected for sure (observe that it is still possible
to elect both x and y and that, like Approval Voting does, at least one alternative has to
be elected). Finally, coherence requires that if x is the unique elected alternative in an
electorate that only votes for x, then there is some other response profile (with strictly
positive support for both alternatives, x and y) at which x is elected (perhaps together
with y). In particular, coherence eliminates constant-like voting rules according to which
one alternative is the unique elected alternative on the domain where both alternatives
receive at least one vote.
Our result states that a voting procedure is consistent in alternatives and voters, anony-
mous, coherent, and satisfies the non-support condition if and only if it is a Weighted
Approval Voting.
Several authors have analyzed Approval Voting axiomatically. Fishburn [14] shows that
if the set of alternatives is fixed and the electorate is allowed to vary, then Approval Voting is
characterized by means of consistency in voters, neutrality, anonymity and disjoint equality
(if two voters approve two nonempty and disjoint subsets of feasible alternatives, then the
union of these two sets has to be elected when there is no other voter). Fishburn [13] also
characterizes Approval Voting by means of consistency in voters, neutrality, faithfulness
(if there is only one voter and this voter approves at least one alternative, the voting
procedure selects all alternatives this voter supports), and cancelation (if all alternative
receive the same number of votes, all alternatives are elected). Alo´s-Ferrer [2] shows that
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this last characterization is not tight since neutrality follows from consistency in voters,
faithfulness, and cancelation. Sertel [20] presents an alternative definition of Approval
Voting that differs from the original one only in the situation when no alternative receives
any vote. He assumes in this case that no alternative is elected. This, slightly different,
voting rule is then characterized by anonymity, weak unanimity (if the society consists
of only one voter, the voting procedure selects the alternatives that the voter supports),
weak consistency (this property weakens consistency in voters slightly without changing
its main idea), and strong disjoint equality (disjoint equality is also defined for the case
when some voter does not approve any alternative). A further characterization is due to
Baigent and Xu [4]. They apply the properties of neutrality, strict monotonicity (if x is
elected at a certain response profile and a second response profile is identical to the first
one apart from the fact that x receives now an additional vote, then only x is elected
at the second response profile) and independence of symmetric substitutions. The latter
condition requires that the set of elected alternatives should be the same in the following
two situations: In the first situation, some voter approves, among other alternatives, x but
not y, whereas another voter approves, among other alternatives, y but not x. The second
situation is identical to the first one with the only difference that the first voter approves
now y but not x and the second voter approves now x but not y. Goodin and List [15]
relate Approval Voting axiomatically to May’s Theorem by showing that Approval Voting
is characterized by anonymity (they define anonymity in a different way than we do, yet,
the two properties turn out to be equivalent), neutrality, and strict monotonicity. Finally,
Fishburn [13] and Vorsatz [22] study Approval Voting axiomatically under the assumption
that individuals have dichotomous preferences (voters divide alternatives into two sets, the
set of good alternatives and the set of bad alternatives; see, for instance, [5]), the context
in which Approval Voting and its extensions become social choice functions. While the first
paper concentrates on the notion of strategy-proofness (incentives to represent preferences
truthfully), the latter explores additionally the efficiency of Approval Voting. Observe that
any Weighted Approval Voting (with strictly positive weights) satisfies strategy-proofness
but only Approval Voting is efficient whenever voters have dichotomous preferences. In fact,
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if the weights are derived from some equity principle, one introduces a trade-off between
efficiency and equity because more unequal weights lead to a less efficient outcome but
stress the underlying equity principle more. Additionally, any Weighted Approval Voting
with strictly positive weights satisfies strict monotonicity and independence of symmetric
substitutions while it fails to satisfy axioms that have neutrality inherent to its definition
as disjoint equality, faithfulness, cancelation, and weak unanimity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next Section, we introduce
our notation and main definitions. In Section 3, we present the five axioms that characterize
Weighted Approval Voting. Afterwards, we prove our theorem. Finally, we establish the
independence of the axioms and conclude with some remarks.
2 Preliminaries
We consider elections in which the set of alternatives and the set of voters may vary. First,
let K be the universal set of conceivable alternatives for election. Generic alternatives will
be denoted by x, y and z. The cardinality of K, κ, is finite and greater or equal to 3
(if the set of universal alternatives contains only two alternatives, then the first axiom,
consistency in alternatives, is superfluous in Theorem 1 as it will become clear later on).
Since it may happen that not all conceivable alternatives are eligible, we restrict the set
of feasible alternatives to be equal to K ⊆ K. Alternatively, we will denote subsets of
alternatives by the capital letters S or T . Second, we represent the universal set of voters
by the set of natural numbers N. We will consider situations in which the set of voters
actually participating in the election, the electorate N , is a finite subset of the natural
numbers. Often we will also use the capital letters A and B to denote electorates. The
cardinalities of N and K are equal to n ≥ 1 and k ≥ 2, respectively.
For any voter i ∈ N, let Mi ∈ 2
K be the set of alternatives i votes for. A profile
M = (Mi)i∈N ∈ (2
K)N is a list of all votes. Given a profileM and an electorateN , a response
profile MN = (Mi)i∈N ∈ (2
K)N is the n-tuple of votes coming from the electorate N at
profile M . We say that the response profiles MA and MB, corresponding to the electorates
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A and B of equal size, are isomorphic if there exists a one-to-one mapping pi : A→ B such
that for all i ∈ A, Mi = Mpi(i). Given two disjoint electorates A and B and two response
profilesMA andMB, denote byMA+MB the response profile (Mi)i∈A∪B ∈ (2
K)A∪B. Given
the response profile MN and alternative x ∈ K, let Gx(MN) = |{i ∈ N : x ∈ Mi}| be the
support of x at MN .
Given a set of feasible alternatives K and an electorate N , a voting rule vK,N : (2K)N →
2K\{∅} selects, for all profiles M , a nonempty set of feasible alternatives vK,N(M) with
the property that for all M,M ′ ∈ (2K)N such that MN = M
′
N , v
K,N(M) = vK,N(M ′).
This is the reason why, with a slight abuse of notation, we will write vK(MN) instead
of vK,N(M). Observe first that, although the empty set can be a component of response
profiles, the images of a given voting rule are nonempty subsets of feasible alternatives.
We exclude the possibility to elect no alternative (even when all feasible alternatives get
zero support), because we want to include the interpretation of the image as the set of
pre-selected alternatives from which an ultimate winning alternative has still to be deter-
mined in a yet to be specified way (i.e., a lottery). Additionally, we aim at generalizing
Approval Voting which, for each response profile, elects the (always nonempty) subset of
feasible alternatives with maximal support. Second, response profiles may include votes
for unfeasible alternatives. These votes are redundant but this formulation simplifies later
on the definition of consistency in alternatives.
A family of voting rules {vK,N : (2K)N → 2K\{∅}}K,N is a set of voting rules, one for
every set of feasible alternatives K and electorate N . It is denoted by v. Given the family
of voting rules v and a particular set of feasible alternatives K, we denote the subfamily
of voting rules {vK,N : (2K)N → 2K\{∅}}N by v
K .
As we have already argued in the Introduction, there are meaningful situations in
which not all alternatives are equally important. Thus, it is our objective to eliminate
the neutrality assumption underlying Approval Voting by allowing for the possibility to
discriminate among alternatives keeping the impact of a vote for a given alternative the
same for all voters.1 For instance, in some elections alternatives may be candidates with
1An alternative approach aims at allowing for different weights for distinct voters maintaining neutrality.
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different characteristics like seniority, sex, age, degree of qualification, field of specialization,
etc. In these elections society may not find it desirable to treat all candidates alike. To
define the natural non-neutral extension of Approval Voting, let R+ be the set of non-
negative real numbers and let R++ be the set of strictly positive real numbers.
Definition 1 The family of voting rules v is a Weighted Approval Voting if there exists a
vector of weights p = (px)x∈K, with px ∈ R+ for all x ∈ K, such that for all sets of feasible
alternatives K, all profiles M ∈ (2K)N, and all electorates N ,
x ∈ vK(MN) if and only if px ·Gx(MN) ≥ py ·Gy(MN) for all y ∈ K. (1)
The family of Weighted Approval Voting with the vector of weights p is denoted by vp.
Approval Voting, denoted vA, is the special case of a Weighted Approval Voting when for all
x, y ∈ K, px = py ∈ R++. Observe first that the constant rule, which elects always the set
of feasible alternatives, is a Weighted Approval Voting with weight zero for all alternatives.
Second, the vector of weights (px)x∈K has one degree of freedom because multiplying the
weights by a strictly positive number does not have any effect on the result of the election.
Remark 1 For all weights p and all λ ∈ R++, vλ·p = vp.
Finally, given the Weighted Approval Voting vp and the set of feasible alternatives K,
the subfamily vKp = {v
K,N
p : (2
K)N → 2K\{∅}}N will be called the Weighted Approval
Voting relative to pK = (px)x∈K .
3 Properties and Characterization
We present now formally the properties that characterize all Weighted Approval Voting.
Two consistency properties describe how the elected set of alternatives varies as the set of
feasible alternatives or the electorate changes.
To analyze the normative foundations of this generalization of Approval Voting is also very prospective
because one can identify a variety situations where this rule is applied. Examples include voting in the EU
Member Council (the weight of a country is determined by its population size) and management boards (a
vote from the CEO counts usually more than a weight from other board members). To our best knowledge,
this rule has not been studied axiomatically so far.
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Consistency in Alternatives: The family of voting rules v is consistent in alternatives
if for all sets of feasible alternatives S ⊂ T ⊆ K, all profiles M ∈ (2K)N, and all electorates
N such that vT (MN) ∩ S 6= ∅,
vS(MN) = v
T (MN) ∩ S.
This property means the following. Assume first that a particular set of alternatives
is feasible and society elects a subset of them. If it turns out afterwards that fewer alter-
natives are feasible, then the set of elected alternatives is restricted accordingly (see [3]).
Consistency in alternatives plays a crucial role in the proof of our characterization because
it establishes the transitivity of the weights and allows us to extend the two alternatives
case to any set of alternatives. For the latter reason we only have to state the other four
properties with respect to two alternatives.
The second consistency property requires that if two disjoint electorates elect some
common alternatives, then exactly these alternatives are elected when the two electorates
are assembled (see [21]). This property insures the additivity of the votes.
Consistency in Voters: The family of voting rules v is consistent in voters if for all
alternatives x, y ∈ K, all profiles M ∈ (2K)N, and all disjoint electorates A,B ⊆ N such
that v{x,y}(MA) ∩ v
{x,y}(MB) 6= ∅,
v{x,y}(MA +MB) = v
{x,y}(MA) ∩ v
{x,y}(MB).
According to the third property the set of elected alternatives depends only on the
support of the alternatives (and hence, the weights will be independent of the identity of
the voters). Formally,
Anonymity: The family of voting rules v is anonymous if for all alternatives x, y ∈ K,
all profiles M,M ′ ∈ (2K)N, and all electorates A and B such that Gx(MA) = Gx(M
′
B) and
Gy(MA) = Gy(M
′
B),
v{x,y}(MA) = v
{x,y}(M ′B).
The fourth axiom refers to response profiles with the property that the support of at
least one of the two feasible alternatives is zero.
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No-Support: The family of voting rules v satisfies the no-support condition if for all
alternatives x, y ∈ K, all profiles M ∈ (2K)N, and all electorates N such that Gx(MN) = 0,
y ∈ v{x,y}(MN).
The last property, coherence, requires basically that for both alternatives x and y
there is some electorate and some response profile (with strictly positive support for both
alternatives) such that the considered alternative is elected.
Coherence: The family of voting rules v is coherent if for all alternatives x, y ∈ K,
all profiles M ∈ (2K)N, and all electorates A such that Gx(MA) > 0 and Gy(MA) = 0,
if v{x,y}(MA) = {x} then there exist a profile M
′ ∈ (2K)N and an electorate N with
Gx(M
′
N) > 0 and Gy(M
′
N) > 0, such that
x ∈ v{x,y}(M ′N).
In Theorem 1 we state an axiomatic characterization of all Weighted Approval Voting
based on these five properties.
Theorem 1 The family of voting rules v is consistent in alternatives and voters, anony-
mous, coherent and satisfies the no-support condition if and only if v is a Weighted Approval
Voting.
4 Proof of the Characterization
We start by proving that in the case of two feasible alternatives the only relevant infor-
mation is not the support of the alternatives (as it follows directly from anonymity) but
rather the fractions of the supports. Afterwards, we prove a monotonicity like property.
Lemma 1 Assume that the family of voting rules v is consistent in voters and anonymous.
Then, for all alternatives x, y ∈ K, all profiles M,M ′ ∈ (2K)N, and all electorates A and
B such that Gy(MA) > 0, Gy(M
′
B) > 0, and
Gx(MA)
Gy(MA)
=
Gx(M ′B)
Gy(M ′B)
,
v{x,y}(MA) = v
{x,y}(M ′B).
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Proof: Let {x, y} be the set of feasible alternatives and take any two response profiles
MA and M
′
B that satisfy the hypothesis of Lemma 1. Consider two electorates A¯ and B¯
of sizes |A| · Gy(M
′
B) and |B| · Gy(MA), respectively. Let M¯A¯ and M¯
′
B¯
be two response
profiles obtained by replicating Gy(M
′
B)-times the response profile MA and Gy(MA)-times
the response profile M ′B, respectively. Namely, the response profile M¯A¯ is the union of
Gy(M
′
B)-isomorphic copies of MA (denoted by MA1 , ...,MAGy(M′B)
) and the response profile
M¯ ′
B¯
is the union of Gy(MA)-isomorphic copies ofM
′
B (denoted byM
′
B1
, ...,M ′BGy(MA)
), where
all electorates At, t = 1, ..., Gy(M
′
B) and all Br, r = 1, ..., Gx(MA) are disjoint. Observe
that Gx(M¯A¯) = Gx(MA) ·Gy(M
′
B) and Gx(M¯
′
B¯
) = Gx(M
′
B) ·Gy(MA). By assumption,
Gx(M¯A¯) = Gx(M¯
′
B¯). (2)
Moreover, Gy(M¯A¯) = Gy(MA) ·Gy(M
′
B) and Gy(M¯
′
B¯
) = Gy(M
′
B) ·Gy(MA). Thus,
Gy(M¯A¯) = Gy(M¯
′
B¯). (3)
By anonymity, (2) and (3) imply
v{x,y}(M¯A¯) = v
{x,y}(M¯ ′B¯). (4)
Also, by anonymity, for all t = 1, ..., Gy(M
′
B) and all r = 1, ..., Gy(MA), v
{x,y}(MAt) =
v{x,y}(MA) and v
{x,y}(M ′Br) = v
{x,y}(M ′B). Then, by iterating on the properties of consis-
tency in voters and anonymity,
v{x,y}(M¯A¯) = v
{x,y}
(∑Gy(M ′B)
t=1
MAt
)
=
Gy(M ′B)⋂
t=1
v{x,y}(MAt) = v
{x,y}(MA)
and
v{x,y}(M¯ ′B¯) = v
{x,y}
(∑Gy(MA)
r=1
M ′Br
)
=
Gy(MA)⋂
r=1
v{x,y}(M ′Br) = v
{x,y}(M ′B).
By (4), v{x,y}(MA) = v
{x,y}(M ′B). 
Lemma 2 Assume that the family of voting rules v is consistent in voters, anonymous, and
satisfies the no-support condition. Then, for all alternatives x, y ∈ K, all profiles M,M ′ ∈
(2K)N, and all electorates A and B such that Gy(MA) > 0, Gy(M
′
B) > 0,
Gx(MA)
Gy(MA)
>
Gx(M ′B)
Gy(MB)
,
and x ∈ v{x,y}(M ′B),
x ∈ v{x,y}(MA).
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Proof: Let {x, y} be the set of feasible alternatives and take any two response profiles
MA and M
′
B that satisfy the hypothesis of Lemma 2. Consider two electorates A¯ and B¯
of sizes |A| ·Gy(M
′
B) and |B| ·Gy(MA), respectively. Let M¯A¯ and M¯
′
B¯
be the two response
profiles obtained by replicating Gy(M
′
B)-times the response profile MA and Gy(MA)-times
the response profile M ′B, respectively. Namely, the response profile M¯A¯ is the union of
Gy(M
′
B)-isomorphic copies of MA and the response profile M¯
′
B¯
is the union of Gy(MA)-
isomorphic copies of M ′B. By consistency in voters and anonymity,
v{x,y}(M¯A¯) = v
{x,y}(MA) and v
{x,y}(M¯ ′B¯) = v
{x,y}(M ′B). (5)
Observe thatGy(M¯A¯) = Gy(MA)·Gy(M
′
B) = Gy(M¯
′
B¯
). Moreover, by hypothesis, Gx(M¯A¯) =
Gx(MA) ·Gy(M
′
B) > Gy(MA) ·Gx(M
′
B) = Gx(M¯
′
B¯
).
Now, take two response profiles MˆC and MˆD corresponding to the disjoint electorates
C and D, with the properties that Gy(MˆD) = Gy(M¯
′
B¯
), Gx(MˆD) = Gx(M¯
′
B¯
), Gy(MˆC) = 0,
and Gx(MˆC) = Gx(M¯A¯)−Gx(M¯
′
B¯
). By anonymity,
v{x,y}(MˆD) = v
{x,y}(M¯ ′B¯). (6)
Since Gx(M¯A¯) = Gx(MˆC)+Gx(M¯
′
B¯
) = Gx(MˆC)+Gx(MˆD), Gy(M¯A¯) = Gy(MˆC)+Gy(MˆD),
and the electorates C and D are disjoint, Gx(M¯A¯) = Gx(MˆC + MˆD) and Gy(M¯A¯) =
Gy(MˆC + MˆD). By anonymity,
v{x,y}(M¯A¯) = v
{x,y}(MˆC + MˆD). (7)
By the no-support condition,
x ∈ v{x,y}(MˆC).
Since, by hypothesis, x ∈ v{x,y}(M ′B), conditions (5) and (6) imply x ∈ v
{x,y}(MˆD). There-
fore,
x ∈ v{x,y}(MˆC) ∩ v
{x,y}(MˆD) 6= ∅. (8)
By consistency in voters,
v{x,y}(MˆC + MˆD) = v
{x,y}(MˆC) ∩ v
{x,y}(MˆD). (9)
Conditions (7), (8), and (9) imply that x ∈ v{x,y}(M¯A¯). Finally, it follows from (5) that
x ∈ v{x,y}(MA). 
12
Given a family of voting rules v we will now construct, for every set {x, y} of feasible
alternatives, two weights, p
{x,y}
x ∈ R+ and p
{x,y}
y ∈ R+, for which the subfamily of voting
rules v{x,y} is the Weighted Approval Voting relative to p{x,y} = (p
{x,y}
x , p
{x,y}
y ).
Lemma 3 Assume that the family of voting rules v is consistent in voters, anonymous,
coherent and satisfies the no-support condition. Then, for all alternatives x, y ∈ K there
exist two weights p
{x,y}
x , p
{x,y}
y ∈ R+ such that v
{x,y} is the Weighted Approval Voting relative
to p{x,y} = (p
{x,y}
x , p
{x,y}
y ).
Proof: Let {x, y} be the set of feasible alternatives and take any v that satisfies the
hypothesis of Lemma 3. We will show that there exist two weights p
{x,y}
x ∈ R+ and
p
{x,y}
y ∈ R+ with the property that for all profiles M , all electorates N , and all z ∈ {x, y},
z ∈ v{x,y}(MN)⇔ p
{x,y}
z ·Gz(MN) ≥ p
{x,y}
w ·Gw(MN) for all w ∈ {x, y}. (10)
To insure that condition (10) holds, we investigate the restrictions that response profiles
impose on the weights. Consider any electorate N and let the response profile MN be
such that Gx(MN) = 0 and Gy(MN) = 0. Since v satisfies the no-support condition,
v{x,y}(MN) = {x, y}. Then, given MN , condition (10) holds for any p
{x,y}
x ∈ R+ and
p
{x,y}
y ∈ R+. So, for all electorates N , response profiles with the property that Gx(MN) =
Gy(MN) = 0 do not impose any restriction on the weights.
In the next step, we focus on two response profiles that give one vote to one alternative
and zero votes to the other. Formally, given any electorate N , letMN andM
′
N be such that
Gx(MN) = 1, Gy(MN) = 0, Gx(M
′
N) = 0 and Gy(M
′
N) = 1. By the no-support condition,
x ∈ v{x,y}(MN) and y ∈ v
{x,y}(M ′N). The latter two conditions restrict the two images to
be v{x,y}(MN) ∈ {{x}, {x, y}} and v
{x,y}(M ′N) ∈ {{y}, {x, y}}. We consider the four cases
separately.
1. Suppose that v{x,y}(MN) = v
{x,y}(M ′N) = {x, y}. By consistency in voters, for all
M ′′N ∈ (2
K)N , v{x,y}(M ′′N) = {x, y}. Thus, condition (10) holds if and only if p
{x,y}
x =
p
{x,y}
y = 0.
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2. Suppose that v{x,y}(MN) = {x} and v
{x,y}(M ′N) = {x, y}. Assume M
′′
N is such that
Gx(M
′′
N) = 0. Then, by consistency in voters (if Gy(M
′′
N) > 0) or by the no-support
condition (if Gy(M
′′
N) = 0), v
{x,y}(M ′′N) = {x, y}. We observe that condition (10)
holds for any p
{x,y}
x ∈ R++ and p
{x,y}
y = 0. Assume M ′′N is such that Gx(M
′′
N) >
0. If Gy(M
′′
N) = 0, the assumption v
{x,y}(MN) = {x} and consistency in voters
imply that v{x,y}(M ′′N) = {x}. If Gy(M
′′
N) > 0, define the response profiles MˆA and
Mˆ ′B as Gy(M
′′
N)-isomorphic copies of M
′
N and Gx(M
′′
N)-isomorphic copies of MN ,
respectively. By consistency in voters, v{x,y}(MˆA) = {x, y} and v
{x,y}(Mˆ ′B) = {x}.
Since M ′′N = MˆA + Mˆ
′
B, consistency in voters implies that v
{x,y}(M ′′N) = v
{x,y}(MˆA +
Mˆ ′B) = v
{x,y}(MˆA) ∩ v
{x,y}(Mˆ ′B) = {x}. Thus, condition (10) holds for any p
{x,y}
x ∈
R++ and p
{x,y}
y = 0.
3. Suppose that v{x,y}(MN) = {x, y} and v
{x,y}(M ′N) = {y}. A symmetric argument as
the one already used for the former case shows that condition (10) holds for p
{x,y}
x = 0
and any p
{x,y}
y ∈ R++.
4. Suppose that v{x,y}(MN) = {x} and v
{x,y}(M ′N) = {y}. Then, condition (10) holds
only if p
{x,y}
x > 0 and p
{x,y}
y > 0. To further restrict the weights in this case, we have
to consider the response profiles in which both alternatives get at least one vote.
Formally, define MN = {M¯N ∈ (2
K)N : Gx(M¯N) > 0 and Gy(M¯N) > 0}. We divide
the analysis of this case into four subcases.
4.1 Assume that for all electorates B and all M˜B ∈ MB, v
{x,y}(M˜B) = {x}. This
contradicts coherence, and therefore, this case cannot be.
4.2 Assume that for all electorates B and all M˜B ∈ MB, v
{x,y}(M˜B) = {y}. This
contradicts coherence, and therefore, this case cannot be.
4.3 Assume that there exists an electorate B and a response profile M˜B ∈MB such
that v{x,y}(M˜B) = {x, y}. Consider any electorate A 6= B and any response
profile MˆA ∈MA. Assume at first that
Gx(MˆA)
Gy(MˆA)
>
Gx(M˜B)
Gy(M˜B)
. (11)
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Since x ∈ v{x,y}(M˜B) by assumption, Lemma 2 implies
x ∈ v{x,y}(MˆA). (12)
Define the response profile M¯B¯ as Gy(MˆA)-isomorphic copies of M˜B. Since
v{x,y}(M˜B) = {x, y}, consistency in voters implies v
{x,y}(M¯B¯) = {x, y}. Define
also the response profile M¯ ′
A¯
as Gy(M˜B)-isomorphic copies of MˆA. By (12),
consistency in voters implies x ∈ v{x,y}(M¯ ′
A¯
). Observe that Gx(M¯
′
A¯
) = Gy(M˜B) ·
Gx(MˆA), Gx(M¯B¯) = Gy(MˆA) · Gx(M˜B), and Gy(M¯
′
A¯
) = Gy(MˆA) · Gy(M˜B) =
Gy(M¯B¯). Let t = Gx(M¯
′
A¯
) − Gx(M¯B¯). By (11), t is a strictly positive integer.
Let MˇC be a response profile obtained from t-isomorphic copies of MN . Then,
M¯ ′
A¯
= M¯B¯ + MˇC . Since v
{x,y}(MN) = {x} by assumption and x ∈ v
{x,y}(M¯B¯),
consistency in voters implies v{x,y}(M¯ ′
A¯
) = {x}. Since
Gx(M¯ ′A¯)
Gy(M¯ ′A¯)
= Gy(M˜B)·Gx(MˆA)
Gy(M˜B)·Gy(MˆA)
=
Gx(MˆA)
Gy(MˆA)
, Lemma 1 implies finally that v{x,y}(MˆA) = v
{x,y}(M¯ ′
A¯
) = {x}. Therefore,
if
Gx(MˆA)
Gy(MˆA)
>
Gx(M˜B)
Gy(M˜B)
, then v{x,y}(MˆA) = {x}. (13)
Assume now that v{x,y}(MˆA) = {x}. Since v
{x,y}(M˜B) = {x, y}, Lemma 1 implies
that Gx(MˆA)
Gy(MˆA)
6= Gx(M˜B)
Gy(M˜B)
. Assume at first that Gx(MˆA)
Gy(MˆA)
< Gx(M˜B)
Gy(M˜B)
. Then, since y ∈
v{x,y}(M˜B) by assumption, we obtain from Lemma 2 that y ∈ v
{x,y}(MˆA) = {x}.
This is a contradiction, and therefore, Gx(MˆA)
Gy(MˆA)
> Gx(M˜B)
Gy(M˜B)
. Hence,
if v{x,y}(MˆA) = {x}, then
Gx(MˆA)
Gy(MˆA)
>
Gx(M˜B)
Gy(M˜B)
. (14)
We conclude from (13) and (14) that
v{x,y}(MˆA) = {x} if and only if
Gx(MˆA)
Gy(MˆA)
>
Gx(M˜B)
Gy(M˜B)
. (15)
Symmetrically, we can obtain that
v{x,y}(MˆA) = {y} if and only if
Gx(MˆA)
Gy(MˆA)
<
Gx(M˜B)
Gy(M˜B)
. (16)
It follows from (15) and (16) that condition (10) holds if and only if p
{x,y}
x =
Gy(M˜B) and p
{x,y}
y = Gx(M˜B).
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4.4 Assume that for all electorates B and all M˜B ∈ MB, v
{x,y}(M˜B) 6= {x, y}
and neither case (4.1) nor case (4.2) holds. Consider the electorate N and a
response profile MˆN with the property that Gx(MˆN) = Gy(MˆN) = 1. Suppose
without loss of generality that v{x,y}(MˆN) = {x}. Moreover, set p
{x,y}
y ≡ 1. It
remains to be shown that there exists a weight p
{x,y}
x ∈ (1,+∞) such that for
all electorates B and all response profiles M˜B such that Gy(M˜B) > Gx(M˜B),
(a) if v{x,y}(M˜B) = {x}, then p
{x,y}
x >
Gy(M˜B)
Gx(M˜B)
and (b) if v{x,y}(M˜B) = {y},
then p
{x,y}
x <
Gy(M˜B)
Gx(M˜B)
. Suppose otherwise; that is, there is no such weight p
{x,y}
x .
Then, there exists an electorate A and two response profiles MA and M
′
A such
that v{x,y}(MA) = {x}, v
{x,y}(M ′A) = {y} and
Gy(MA)
Gx(MA)
>
Gy(M ′A)
Gx(M ′A)
. But, since
Gy(MA)
Gx(MA)
>
Gy(M ′A)
Gx(M ′A)
and v{x,y}(M ′A) = {y}, it follows from Lemma 2 that y ∈
v{x,y}(MA) = {x}. This is a contradiction. 
We have shown that for any pair of alternatives x, y ∈ K, there are two non-negative
weights, p
{x,y}
x and p
{x,y}
y , such that the subfamily of voting rules v{x,y} is the Weighted
Approval Voting relative to these weights (observe that the proof of Lemma 3 is constructive
apart from part 4.4; in the final Section, we explain how the weights can be obtained in
this case). Hence, for every alternative x ∈ K there are κ− 1 weights, one weight that can
be applied in combination with each alternative y 6= x. In the next two Lemmata we show
that it is possible to construct a single weight for every alternative.
Lemma 4 Assume that the family of voting rules v is consistent in alternatives and voters,
anonymous, coherent and satisfies the no-support condition. Given alternative x ∈ K, if
v{x,y} is the Weighted Approval Voting relative to p{x,y} = (0, p
{x,y}
y ) for some y 6= x, then
for all z ∈ K\{x, y}, v{x,z} is the Weighted Approval Voting relative to p{x,z} = (0, p
{x,z}
z ).
Proof: Suppose otherwise; that is, p{x,y} = (0, p
{x,y}
y ) and for some z ∈ K\{x, y},
p
{x,z}
x > 0. Consider any electorate N of size n ≥ 1 and let the response profileMN be such
that Gy(MN) = Gz(MN) = 0 and Gx(MN) = 1. Since p
{x,z}
x > 0 and v{x,z} is by Lemma 3
the Weighted Approval Voting relative to p{x,z} = (p
{x,z}
x , p
{x,z}
z ), v{x,z}(MN) = {x}. Thus,
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by consistency in alternatives, z 6∈ v{x,y,z}(MN). Moreover, since by assumption v
{x,y} is
the Weighted Approval Voting relative to p{x,y} = (0, p
{x,y}
y ), v{x,y}(MN) = {x, y}. Thus,
by consistency in alternatives, v{x,y,z}(MN) 6∈ {{x}, {y}}. Observe that v
{x,y,z}(MN) 6∈
{{x}, {y}} and z 6∈ v{x,y,z}(MN) imply that v
{x,y,z}(MN) = {x, y}. By consistency in
alternatives, v{y,z}(MN) = v
{x,y,z}(MN) ∩ {y, z} = {y}. By the no-support condition,
v{y,z}(MN) = {y, z}, which is a contradiction. 
Lemma 5 Assume that the family of voting rules v is consistent in alternatives and voters,
anonymous, coherent and satisfies the no-support condition. Then, there exists a κ-tuple of
weights (pz)z∈K ∈ R
κ
+ such that for all alternatives x, y ∈ K, v
{x,y} is the Weighted Approval
Voting relative to p{x,y} = (px, py).
Proof: The proof is done by induction on the set of feasible alternatives K ⊂ K. Take
any K ⊂ K of cardinality two. By Lemma 3, there are two weights (pKx )x∈K ∈ R
2
+ such
that vK is the Weighted Approval Voting relative to pK .
Induction Hypothesis: Suppose that given the set of feasible alternatives K ⊂ K of
cardinality k ≥ 3, there exists a k-tuple of weights
(
pKx
)
x∈K
∈ Rk+ such that for all x, y ∈ K,
v{x,y} is the Weighted Approval Voting relative to p{x,y} = (pKx , p
K
y ).
We have to prove that if the set of feasible alternatives is equal to K ∪ {z}, z 6∈ K, then
there exists a k+1-tuple of weights (p
K∪{z}
x )x∈K∪{z} ∈ R
k+1
+ such that for all x, y ∈ K∪{z},
v{x,y} is the Weighted Approval Voting relative to p{x,y} = (p
K∪{z}
x , p
K∪{z}
y ).
For all alternatives x ∈ K, let p
K∪{z}
x = pKx . Then, for all x, y ∈ K, v
{x,y} is the
Weighted Approval Voting relative to p{x,y} = (p
K∪{z}
x , p
K∪{z}
y ) by the induction hypothesis.
It remains to determine the weight p
K∪{z}
z . To do so, we divide our analysis in two cases,
but first, by Lemma 3, we know that for all x ∈ K, there exist two weights p{x,z}x and p
{x,z}
z
such that v{x,z} is the Weighted Approval Voting relative to these weights.
1. Suppose that for all x ∈ K, p
{x,z}
x = 0. By Lemma 4, for all y 6= x, p
{x,y}
x = 0.
Hence, p
K∪{z}
x = 0 for all x ∈ K, because if it was the case that for some x ∈ K,
p
K∪{z}
x > 0, then there would be an alternative y ∈ K\{x} such that v{x,y} would
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not be the Weighted Approval Voting relative to pKx and p
K
y . This would contradict
the induction hypothesis. Now, if p
{x,z}
z = 0 for some x ∈ K, then, by Lemma 4,
p
{y,z}
z = 0 for all y ∈ K. In this case, we set p
K∪{z}
z = 0. If, on the other hand,
p
{x,z}
z > 0 for some x ∈ K, then it follows from the contrapositive of Lemma 4 that
p
{y,z}
z > 0 for all y ∈ K. In this case, any p
K∪{z}
z ∈ R++ will have the property that
for all x ∈ K, v{x,z} is the Weighted Approval Voting relative to p{x,z} = (0, p
K∪{z}
z ).
2. Suppose that for alternative x ∈ K, p
{x,z}
x > 0. If p
{x,z}
z = 0, then, by Lemma 4,
p
{y,z}
z = 0 for all y ∈ K. In this case, set p
K∪{z}
z = 0. Therefore, suppose from now
on that p
{x,z}
z > 0. By Remark 1, the weights p
{x,z}
x and p
{x,z}
z are determined up to
proportional changes; that is, if we multiply both by λ > 0, then the result of the
election does not change. Set λ equal to p
K∪{z}
x = λ·p
{x,z}
x , or, λ = p
K∪{z}
x /p
{x,z}
x (note
that by the contrapositive of Lemma 4, p
{x,z}
x > 0 implies that for all y 6= x, p
{x,y}
x > 0;
hence, by the induction hypothesis, the weight pKx = p
K∪{z}
x > 0). Similarly, let
p
K∪{z}
z = λ · p
{x,z}
z = p
{x,z}
z · p
K∪{z}
x /p
{x,z}
x . Without loss of generality we can also
define p
K∪{z}
x ≡ 1. Then, p
K∪{z}
z = p
{x,z}
z /p
{x,z}
x . Since v{x,z} is the Weighted Approval
Voting relative to (p
{x,z}
x , p
{x,z}
z ) by Lemma 3, we conclude that this subfamily is also
the Weighted Approval Voting relative to p{x,z} = (p
K∪{z}
x , p
K∪{z}
z ).
It remains to be shown that given alternative y ∈ K\{x}, v{y,z} is the Weighted
Approval Voting relative to p{y,z} = (p
K∪{z}
y , p
K∪{z}
z ). To do so, we prove that there
exists a µ > 0 such that p
K∪{z}
y = µ · p
{y,z}
y and p
K∪{z}
z = µ · p
{y,z}
z . Rewrite the
equations as p
K∪{z}
y · p
{y,z}
z = p
K∪{z}
z · p
{y,z}
y (observe that the assumption p
{x,z}
z > 0
implies that p
{y,z}
z > 0 by the contrapositive of Lemma 4) and suppose otherwise.
That is,
δ ≡ pK∪{z}z · p
{y,z}
y − p
K∪{z}
y · p
{y,z}
z > 0.
Note that we can deal with the case δ < 0 using a symmetric argument. Let p¯z ≡
nz
mz
and p¯y ≡
ny
my
be two rational numbers such that p¯z < p
K∪{z}
z , p¯y > p
K∪{z}
y , and
p¯z · p
{y,z}
y − p¯y · p
{y,z}
z > 0. (17)
Here, ny,my, nz and mz are strictly positive integers. Observe that p¯y and p¯z must
exist, because the set of rational numbers is dense in the set of real numbers. Rewrite
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equation (17) as
p{y,z}y · (nz ·my) > p
{y,z}
z · (ny ·mz). (18)
Consider now the electorate N of size n ≥ min{ny · nz, ny · mz, nz · my} and let
the response profile MN be such that Gx(MN) = nz · ny, Gy(MN) = nz · my, and
Gz(MN) = ny · mz. Since, by Lemma 3, v
{y,z} is the Weighted Approval Voting
relative to p{y,z} = (p
{y,z}
y , p
{y,z}
z ), v{y,z}(MN) = {y} by equation (18). This implies,
by consistency in alternatives, that z 6∈ v{x,y,z}(MN).
In addition, Gx(MN) = p¯y ·Gy(MN) > p
K∪{z}
y ·Gy(MN). Since v
{x,y} is the Weighted
Approval Voting relative to p{x,y} = (1, p
K∪{z}
y ) by construction, v{x,y}(MN) = {x}.
This implies, by consistency in alternatives, that y 6∈ v{x,y,z}(MN).
The two conditions z 6∈ v{x,y,z}(MN) and y 6∈ v
{x,y,z}(MN) imply together that
v{x,y,z}(MN) = {x}. Hence, v
{x,y,z}(MN) ∩ {x, z} = {x} and, by consistency in
alternatives, v{x,z}(MN) = {x}. Finally, since v
{x,z} is the Weighted Approval Voting
relative to p{x,z} = (1, p
K∪{z}
z ) by construction, v{x,z}(MN) = {x} is equivalent to
p
K∪{z}
z ·Gz(MN) < 1 ·Gx(MN). But p
K∪{z}
z ·Gz(MN) > p¯z ·Gz(MN) =
nz
mz
· ny ·mz =
Gx(MN). This is a contradiction.
Hence, there is a (k + 1)-tuple of non-negative and finite weights (p
K∪{z}
x )x∈K∪{z} such
that for all x, y ∈ K ∪ {z}, v{x,y} is the Weighted Approval Voting relative to p{x,y} =
(p
K∪{z}
x , p
K∪{z}
x ). The Lemma follows finally from the case K ∪ {z} = K and px ≡ p
K
x for
all x ∈ K. 
In the last step of the proof, we apply consistency in alternatives to generalize Lemma
5 to all sets of feasible alternatives.
Proof of Theorem 1: Any Weighted Approval Voting satisfies consistency in alterna-
tives and voters, anonymity, the no-support condition and coherence. To prove the other
implication let v be a family of voting rules that satisfies consistency in alternatives and
voters, anonymity, the no-support condition, and coherence. We show that the κ-tuple of
non-negative and finite weights (px)x∈K identified in Lemma 5 is such that for all sets of
feasible alternatives K, all profiles M , and all electorates N ,
19
x ∈ vK(MN) if and only if px ·Gx(MN) ≥ py ·Gy(MN) for all y ∈ K.
Assume that x ∈ vK(MN). Then, by consistency in alternatives, x ∈ v
{x,y}(MN)
for all y ∈ K\{x}. By Lemma 5, v{x,y} is the Weighted Approval Voting relative to
p{x,y} = (px, py). Hence, px ·Gx(MN) ≥ py ·Gy(MN) for all y ∈ K.
Assume that px · Gx(MN) ≥ py · Gy(MN) for all y ∈ K. Then, for all y 6= x, x ∈
v{x,y}(MN) because, by Lemma 5, v
{x,y} is the Weighted Approval Voting relative to p{x,y} =
(px, py). If there is some z 6= x such that z ∈ v
K(MN), then the set v
K(MN) ∩ {x, z} 6= ∅.
Hence, v{x,z}(MN) = v
K(MN) ∩ {x, z} by consistency in alternatives. Since, by Lemma 5,
v{x,z} is the Weighted Approval Voting relative to p{x,z} = (px, pz), x ∈ v
{x,z}(MN). Hence,
x ∈ vK(MN). If there does not exist any alternative z 6= x such that z ∈ v
K(MN), then
x ∈ vK(MN) because the set v
K(MN) cannot be empty. 
5 Final Remarks
We show next, with the help of five examples, the independence of the properties used
in Theorem 1. Afterwards, we indicate a procedure to obtain the weights in case 4.4 of
Lemma 3, the only subcase where our proof is not constructive. We finish the paper with
two remarks. We show in Subsection 5.3 how to strengthen the no-support condition to
obtain Weighted Approval Voting with strictly positive weights and describe in Subsection
5.4 some similarities between the construction of our proof and proofs used in the literatures
of Weighted Utilitarism and Ranking of Opportunity Sets.
5.1 Independence of the Axioms
Consistency in Alternatives: Fix x ∈ K. Let the family of voting rules v be such that
for all sets of feasible alternatives K of size two, all profiles M , and all electorates N ,
vK(MN) = v
K
A (MN). Otherwise, apply the Weighted Approval Voting with weights px = 2
and py = 1 for all y 6= x. This family satisfies consistency in voters, anonymity, the no-
support condition and coherence. The following example shows that it is not consistent
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in alternatives. Let K = {x, y, z} and suppose that N = {i, j}. If Mi = Mj = K, then
v{x,y}(Mi +Mj) = {x, y} and v
{x,y,z}(Mi +Mj) = {x}. Consistency in alternatives would
imply that v{x,y}(Mi +Mj) = v
{x,y,z}(Mi +Mj) ∩ {x, y} = {x}. Hence, v does not satisfy
consistency in alternatives.
Consistency in Voters: Let the family of voting rules v be such that for all sets of feasible
alternatives K, all profiles M , and all electorates N , if Gx(MN) > 1 for some x ∈ K, then
vK(MN) = v
K
A (MN). Otherwise, apply the Weighted Approval Voting with weights px = 2
and py = 1 for all y 6= x. This family satisfies consistency in alternatives, anonymity,
the no-support condition, and coherence. The following example shows that it is not
consistent in voters. Let K = {x, y, z} and suppose that N = {i, j}. If Mi = Mj = {x, y},
then v{x,y}(Mi) = v
{x,y}(Mj) = {x} and v
{x,y}(Mi +Mj) = {x, y}. Consistency in voters
would imply that v{x,y}(Mi + Mj) = v
{x,y}(Mi) ∩ v
{x,y}(Mj) = {x}. Hence, v does not
satisfy consistency in voters.
Anonymity: Assign to each voter i ∈ N a strictly positive number qi in such a way that
qi 6= qj for some pair i, j ∈ N. Now, let the family of voting rules v be such that for all sets
of feasible alternatives K, all profiles M , and all electorates N , x ∈ vK(MN) if and only if∑
i∈N :x∈Mi
qi ≥
∑
i∈N :y∈Mi
qi for all y ∈ K. This family satisfies consistency in alternatives
and voters, the no-support condition, and coherence. The following example shows that it
is not anonymous. Let K = {x, y, z} and suppose that N = {i, j}. Moreover, let qi = 2
and qj = 1. If Mi = M
′
j = {x} and M
′
i = Mj = {y}, then v
{x,y}(Mi +Mj) = {x} and
v{x,y}(M ′i +M
′
j) = {y}. Hence, v does not satisfy anonymity.
No-Support: Let the family of voting rules v be such that for all sets of feasible alternatives
K, all profiles M , and all electorates N , x ∈ vK(MN) if and only if Gx(MN) ≤ Gy(MN)
for all y ∈ K. This family satisfies consistency in alternatives and voters, anonymity, and
coherence. The following example shows that it does not satisfy the no-support condition.
Let K = {x, y, z} and suppose that N = {i, j}. If Mi = Mj = {x}, then v
{x,y}(Mi+Mj) =
{y}. Hence, v does not satisfy the no-support condition.
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Coherence: Let η : K → {1, ..., κ} be any one-to-one mapping that assigns to every x ∈ K
a natural number between 1 and κ. Given η, let the family of voting rules v be such that
for all sets of feasible alternatives K, all profiles M , and all electorates N , vK(MN) = {y ∈
K : Gy(MN) > 0 and η(y) < η(z) for all z ∈ K s.t. Gz(MN) > 0}. If no alternative gets
any vote, then vK(MN) = K. This family satisfies consistency in alternatives and voters,
anonymity, and the no-support condition. The following example shows that it does not
satisfy coherence. Let K = {x, y, z} and define η to be such that η(x) = 1 and η(y) = 2.
Then, for all profiles M and all electorates N such that Gx(MN) > 0 and Gy(MN) > 0,
v{x,y}(MN) = {x}. Hence, v does not satisfy coherence.
An additional point which is also related to the independence of the properties regards
the question whether it is possible to obtain a similar characterization of all Weighted
Approval Voting for a given electorate (given set of feasible alternatives); that is, if the
electorate (the set of feasible alternatives) is fixed at N (K) and the corresponding consis-
tency property is dropped, is the class of all Weighted Approval Voting characterized by
the remaining four properties? The following two examples show that this is not the case.
Example 1: Suppose that the electorate is equal to N = {1, 2} and the set of alternatives
is K = {x, y, z}. Let the family of voting rules vˆ = {vˆK,N : (2K)N → 2K\{∅}}K be such
that for all sets of feasible alternatives K ⊆ K and all response profiles MN ∈ (2
K)N such
that Gr(MN) > 0 for some r ∈ K, vˆ
K(MN) = {r ∈ K : Gr(MN) > 0}. If no alternatives
receives any vote, the set K is elected. This family of voting rules satisfies consistency in
alternatives, anonymity, coherence, and the no-support condition. Yet, vˆ is not a Weighted
Approval Voting because there does not exist a vector of finite weights p = (px, py, pz) ∈ R
3
+
such that for all K ⊆ K and all response profiles MN ∈ (2
K)N ,
r ∈ vˆK(MN) if and only if pr ·Gr(MN) ≥ ps ·Gs(MN) for all s ∈ K. (19)
To see it, consider the set of feasible alternatives K = {x, y} and two response profiles
MN andM
′
N with the property that Gx(MN) = Gy(M
′
N) = 1 and Gx(M
′
N) = Gy(MN) = 2.
Observe that, by definition of vˆ, vˆ{x,y}(MN) = vˆ
{x,y}(M ′N) = {x, y}. Let (px, py) ∈ R
2
+ be an
arbitrary vector of finite and non-negative weights. Condition (19) implies simultaneously
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that px = 2 · py and 2 · px = py. Hence, px = py = 0. Now take any response profile M
′′
N
which satisfies Gx(M
′′
N) > 0 and Gy(M
′′
N) = 0. Since vˆ(M
′′
N) = {x} by definition, condition
(19) implies that px > 0. This contradicts px = 0.
Example 2: Suppose that the set of feasible alternatives is equal to K = {x, y, z}. Let
the family of voting rules v˜ = {v˜K,N : (2K)N → 2K\{∅}}N be such that for all profiles
M ∈ (2K)N and all electorates N , (a) if Gx(MN) = Gy(MN) > 0 and Gz(MN) = 0,
v˜K(MN) = {x}, (b) if Gy(MN) = Gz(MN) > 0 and Gx(MN) = 0, v˜
K(MN) = {y}, and
(c) if Gx(MN) = Gz(MN) > 0 and Gy(MN) = 0, v˜
K(MN) = {z}. Otherwise, v˜
K(MN) =
vKA (MN). This family of voting rules is consistent in voters, anonymous (it depends only
on the amount of votes every alternative receives), coherent (given an alternative, there
is a situation in which all alternatives have strictly positive support and the considered
alternative belongs to the image), and satisfies the no-support condition (if an alternative
does not get any vote it is selected if and only if all alternatives have zero support). Yet,
v˜ is not a Weighted Approval Voting because the cycle induces non-transitive weights for
pairs of alternatives. To see it, assume otherwise, and let p = (px, py, pz) ∈ R
3
+ be the
vector of weights associated to v˜. Then, (a) implies that px > py, (b) implies that py > pz,
and (c) implies that pz > px, a contradiction.
5.2 The Weights in Case 4.4 of Lemma 3
Figure 1 below indicates the first steps of a procedure to obtain the weights p
{x,y}
x and
p
{x,y}
y in the subcase 4.4 of Lemma 3, the situation when, for response profiles in which
both alternatives receive strictly positive support, never {x, y} is elected and neither {x}
nor {y} are always elected. Since, in this case, both weights have to be strictly positive, we
can normalize them. Without loss of generality, assume that the subfamily of voting rules
v{x,y} has the property that for all response profiles MN with Gx(MN) = Gy(MN) = 1,
v{x,y}(MN) = {x}. (20)
Set p
{x,y}
y ≡ 1. To obtain p
{x,y}
x ∈ R++, we construct a tree that resembles all possible
subfamilies v{x,y} (satisfying condition (20); otherwise, a symmetric argument to obtain
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p
{x,y}
y ∈ R++ will follow with p
{x,y}
x ≡ 1). Namely, each subfamily v{x,y} satisfying condition
(20) is identified with a particular branch in the tree and, vice versa, each branch in
the tree can be identified with a unique subfamily v{x,y} satisfying condition (20). A
node in this tree corresponds to sizes of electorates. Then, we assign to the tth-node of
a particular branch (which corresponds to any electorate of at most t voters) a triple
(Gt, zt, Pt). In this triple, Gt = (G
t
x, G
t
y) corresponds to any response profile MN , where
Gx(MN) = G
t
x and Gy(MN) = G
t
y. Given Gt = (G
t
x, G
t
y), any response profile MN with
this property will be called decisive, because it restricts the weight of x for electorates
of size t. Moreover, zt = v
{x,y}(MN) is equal to the alternative elected at a decisive
response profile Gt (remember, {x, y} is never elected) and Pt = (lt, ut), 0 < lt ≤ ut with
ut ∈ R++ ∪ {+∞}, is the set of weights from which p
{x,y}
x could still be selected. As we
will argue later on, the final weight assigned to x is the (irrational) number p
{x,y}
x such that
limt→∞ lt = p
{x,y}
x = limt→∞ ut.
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Figure 1: Construction of Weights
t = 1. Any decisive response profile MN is such that Gx(MN) = Gy(MN) = 1. We have
assumed, without loss of generality, that v{x,y}(MN) = {x}. Then, z1 = {x}. Since
p
{x,y}
y = 1, we obtain P1 = (1,+∞) because any p
{x,y}
x ∈ (1,+∞) could still be
selected. This case corresponds to the top node in Figure 1.
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t = 2. Observe first that, by Lemma 2, at every response profile MN such that Gx(MN) ≥
Gy(MN), v
{x,y}(MN) = {x}. Thus, we restrict our attention to response profiles MN
with the property that Gx(MN) < Gy(MN). Hence, any response profile M
′
N where
Gx(M
′
N) = 1 and Gy(M
′
N) = 2 is decisive. If v
{x,y}(M ′N) = {x}, then set P2 =
(2,+∞) because all weights below 2 have to be excluded and any p
{x,y}
x ∈ (2,+∞)
could still be selected. On the other hand, if v{x,y}(M ′N) = {y}, then set P2 ∈ (1, 2)
because all weights above 2 have to be excluded and any p
{x,y}
x ∈ (1, 2) could still
be selected. These two cases correspond to either node (G2 = (1, 2), z2 = {x}, P2 =
(2,+∞)) or node (G2 = (1, 2), z2 = {y}, P2 = (1, 2)) in Figure 1.
t = 3. If {x} has been elected at the decisive response profile for t = 2 (the former case
above), then any decisive response profileMN for t = 3 is such that Gx(MN) = 1 and
Gy(MN) = 3. If v
{x,y}(MN) = {x} then set P3 = (3,+∞) and if v
{x,y}(MN) = {y}
then set P3 = (2, 3). On the other hand, if {y} has been elected instead (the latter case
above), then any response profileMN , where Gx(MN) = 2 and Gy(MN) = 3, becomes
decisive for t = 3. If v{x,y}(MN) = {x} then set P3 = (1.5, 2) and if v
{x,y}(MN) = {y}
then set P3 = (1, 1.5).
Observe that for some t’s (for instance, for t = 4), there exist subfamilies of voting rules
v{x,y} with the property that their images are fully determined by the analysis of smaller
electorates and Lemma 2. In these cases, the set of possible weights is not adjusted. We
conclude our description by presenting a recursive algorithm that calculates, for a given
v{x,y}, the weight p
{x,y}
x . Suppose that the triple (Gt, zt, Pt) has already been calculated.
Solve the program: Given (Gt, zt, Pt) choose (G
t+1
x , G
t+1
y ) to
min Gt+1x +G
t+1
y s.t. if zt = {x} ⇒ t+ 1 ≥ G
t+1
y > G
t
y and t+ 1 ≥ G
t+1
x ≥ G
t
x,
if zt = {y} ⇒ t+ 1 ≥ G
t+1
y ≥ G
t
y and t+ 1 ≥ G
t+1
x > G
t
x,
Gt+1x < G
t+1
y , and
Gt+1y
Gt+1x
∈ Pt.
If this program has a unique solution, then any response profile MN with Gx(MN) =
Gt+1x and Gy(MN) = G
t+1
y is decisive for t + 1. Now, update the set Pt as follows: If
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v{x,y}(MN) = {x}, then lt+1 =
Gt+1y
Gt+1x
and ut+1 = ut. Similarly, if v
{x,y}(MN) = {y}, then
lt+1 = lt and ut+1 =
Gt+1y
Gt+1x
. Set Pt+1 = (lt+1, ut+1). Moreover, let zt+1 = v
{x,y}(MN). On
the other hand, if this program does not have a solution, then set (Gt+1, zt+1, Pt+1) =
(Gt, zt, Pt). This iterative process yields, for a given v
{x,y}, two sequences, {lt}
∞
t=1 and
{ut}
∞
t=1. First, and since v
{x,y} is such that there exists a response profile MN ∈ MN at
which v{x,y}(MN) 6= {x} (i.e., we are not in case 4.1 of Lemma 3), there must exist a
T > 1 with the property that uT = T and lT = T − 1. Moreover, {ut}
∞
t=T is a decreasing
sequence in the compact set [T − 1, T ], {lt}
∞
t=T is increasing in [T − 1, T ], and for all
t ≥ 1, lt < ut. Hence, both sequences converge and limt→∞ lt ≡ l ≤ u ≡ limt→∞ ut.
To see that l = u suppose otherwise; that is, u > l. Then, there is a rational number
q ≡ n
m
∈ (l, u), because the rational numbers are dense in the set of real numbers. Take
now any response profile MN which is such that Gx(MN) = m and Gy(MN) = n. In this
case, q · Gx(MN) = Gy(MN). Since the subfamily v
{x,y} does never elect the set {x, y},
v{x,y} cannot be a Weighted Approval Voting relative to p{x,y} = (q, 1). Hence, q cannot
belong to the set (l, u), and therefore, u = l. Observe finally that p
{x,y}
x = u = l must be
an irrational number, because otherwise there would again be a response profile for which
the set {x, y} is elected.
5.3 No-Support Condition
According to Theorem 1, the weights are non-negative. If we strengthen the no-support
condition, then we obtain a similar result in which the weights have to be strictly positive.
Strong No-Support: The family of voting rules v satisfies the strong no-support con-
dition if for all x, y ∈ K, all profiles M,M ′ ∈ (2K)N, and all electorates N such that
Gx(MN) = Gy(MN) = Gx(M
′
N) = 0 and Gy(M
′
N) > 0,
v{x,y}(MN) = {x, y} and v
{x,y}(M ′N) = {y}.
Corollary 1 The family of voting rules v is consistent in alternatives and voters, anony-
mous, coherent and satisfies the strong no-support condition if and only if v is a Weighted
Approval Voting relative to (px)x∈K, where px ∈ R++ for all x ∈ K.
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If we now add neutrality to these properties, then we obtain Approval Voting. Formally,
given a one-to-one mapping µ : K → K, called a permutation µ of K, and given a response
profileMN , let µ(MN) and µ(K) be the response profile and the set of alternatives obtained
by permuting alternatives according to µ.
Neutrality: The family of voting rules v is neutral if for all x, y ∈ K, all profiles M , all
electorates N , and all permutations µ of K,
vµ({x,y})(µ(MN)) = µ
(
v{x,y}(MN)
)
.
Corollary 2 The family of voting rules v is consistent in alternatives and voters, anony-
mous, neutral, coherent, and satisfies the strong no-support condition if and only if v is
Approval Voting.
Observe that Corollary 2 is not tight, because there is no v that violates coherence
but satisfies consistency in alternatives and voters, anonymity, neutrality and the strong
no-support condition.
5.4 Weighted Utilitarianism and Ranking of Opportunity Sets
Our proof uses a construction that has some similarities with arguments already used in the
weighted utility theory as well as in the literature on the ranking of opportunity sets. In the
first case (see Bossert and Weymark [6]), consider an individual with utility u : R2+ → R
over consumption bundles of two goods. Under a set of axioms it is shown that the utility
function u is weighted utilitarian; i.e., there exist two weights q1 ≥ 0 and q2 ≥ 0 such that
for all (x1, x2), (y1, y2) ∈ R
2
+, u(x1, x2) > u(y1, y2) if and only if q1x1 + q2x2 > q1y1 + q2y2.
Then, using a separability condition, the utility function is extended from the two-goods
case to the n-goods case. In the second literature, the aim is to order the family of all
non-empty subsets of a given set of alternatives according to two principles related to
the opportunities they convey: indirect utility (maximal element) and freedom of choice
(cardinality of the set). Dutta and Sen [12] and Alcalde-Unzu and Ballester [1] show that
generalized utilitarian rules (additive aggregation of the two criteria) are the unique ones
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that satisfy a desirable set of axioms. The construction is also based on identifying the
two weights for every pair of subsets and then extend them in a consistent manner to the
full power set.
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